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India and China make a perfect comparison pair in the area of IT industry, with 
each having its unique strength and potential for cooperation and synergy. Due to 
heavy involvement of Indian IT firms in software outsourcing arrangement by 
MNEs, the IP or patent resources are not important. This is especially true when 
compared with Chinese IT firms, which have much larger patenting volume 
(compared with other manufacturing sectors). Film industry in India and China 
has grown despite piracy. In other words, it prospered with little or no copyright 
protection. More importantly, piracy in China and India did not kill the content 
industry, film and music alike, but probably helped in building the customer base 
and cultivating future demand, which might not be true for a small economy with 
a sophisticated audience such as Hong Kong. India can look at China to find IT 
means for delivery and payment of cinematographic content. India and China 
make a perfect comparison pair in the pharmaceutical industry as well. This time 
around, China can learn much from India. Although there is an increase in the 
number of patented drugs in the pharmaceutical industry in China, patents have 
made relatively low contribution to the industrial value, and IP held by Chinese 
Special thanks to two of the first author’s PhD students at Renmin University of China, Zhang 
Haoran and Liu Jianchen, and Professor He Jun, Graduate School at Shenzhen, Tsinghua 
University, for their help in collecting and analyzing relevant materials.
2firms is less competitive compared with that of foreign companies. In contrast, 
major Indian generic companies continue to invest sizeable shares of their sales 
turnover in R&D, which was manifest in their patenting behavior. They were 
more active in filing patent applications in foreign jurisdictions, but significantly 
less so in domestic patenting. The Indian automobile industry’s absorption of 
global best practices has been slower than its Chinese counterpart. Strategies of 
firms in the Chinese auto industry provided a boost to technological learning 
more quickly and broadly than in India, especially in the electric vehicle sector. 
India can benefit from learning from China. IP has a relatively limited role in the 
development of the automobile industry in India and China.
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1  Background
In October 2014, ARCIALA held a workshop on “The Actual Role of IP in the 
Technological and Business Innovation in India and China” with an aim of bridging 
the monolithic elephant and dragon. This workshop was the first of its kind, though 
small in scale, and led to the publication of the book Innovation and IPRs in China 
and India—Myths, Realities and Opportunities in 2016.1 It was felt that the topic is 
worth further exploration.
As a follow-up ARCIALA co-hosted a 2-day workshop with Renmin University 
of China, Jindal Global University (New Delhi, India), and the German Max Planck 
Institute for Innovation and Competition on “Innovation, Economic Development 
and IP in India and China” on September 27 and 28, 2016, with expanded ambit and 
refreshed focus. This workshop was more of a preparatory nature, as it was about 
searching for a research framework, topics, questions, and approaches.
The workshop strived to examine the development of industries which are reflec-
tive of the innovation and economic development of the two giant economies or of 
vital importance to them. During that examination, it was asked why certain indus-
tries have developed in one country and not in the other and what role state innova-
tion policy and/or IP policy has played. Is it causal, facilitating, crippling, 
co-relational, or simply irrelevant? What can India and China learn from each other, 
and is there any possibility of synergy, especially given that China is aging rapidly 
while half of the population of India is under 25?2
1 Kung-Chung Liu/Uday S. Racherla (ed.), Innovation and IPR in China and India—Myth, Realities 
and Opportunities, Springer 2016.
2 According to Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_India), more than 50% 
of India’s population are below the age of 25 and more than 65% are below the age of 35. It is 
expected that, in 2020, the average age of an Indian will be 29 years, compared to 37 for China and 
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3Six topics for this workshop were chosen: Innovation and IPR Policy, Open 
Innovation: Peer Production and the Sharing Economy, Film Industry, Software 
Industry, Pharmaceutical Industry and Developments in the Protection of Plant 
Varieties and Food Security. The width and depth of this study went beyond the 
domain of legal academics. Therefore, economists and management professors 
were invited to speak as well.
After the workshop, it was recognized that a solid empirical study on one specific 
industry in India and China should be first conducted as a pilot project, which can 
serve as a model for other study groups on different industries. The information 
technology (IT) industry was chosen3 given its vital importance to innovation and 
economic development in China and India. This pilot project was funded by the 
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition and set out to answer the fol-
lowing questions:
 (1) Why have IT services, business process outsourcing (BPO)/business process 
management (BPM), and the software industry developed in India and not in 
China?
 (2) Why has the hardware industry developed in China and not in India?
 (3) What role has state innovation policy played? Is it causal, facilitating, crippling, 
co-relational or simply irrelevant?
 (4) What role has national IT infrastructure played?
 (5) What role has IT sui generis legislation played?
 (6) What role has IP (national policy, laws, rights, and adjudicated cases) played? 
Is it causal, facilitating, crippling, co-relational, or simply irrelevant?
 (7) What can India and China learn from each other?
In addition, we have convened another six study groups to continue our research 
topics of the 2016 workshop with recalibration: (1) IP codification and innovation 
governance, (2) film industry, (3) pharmaceutical industry, (4) plant varieties and 
food industry, (5) automobile industry, and (6) peer production and the sharing 
economy.
On December 18–19, 2017, we held a sequel conference on Innovation, Economic 
Development and IP in India and China in Renmin University of China in Beijing. 
The seven study groups got together and discussed their initial findings. Two high- 
ranking judiciary members from India were invited and could not come due to inter-
nal rules. Their presence would have greatly enhanced our endeavor.
48 for Japan.
3 We have chosen to focus on IT industry, rather than on information communication technology 
(ICT) industry, as India and China do not make a good pair for comparison. ICT includes (tele)
communication, which is highly regulated in China and not open to competition, and innovation 
can only happen under constraints. In contrast, (tele)communication is less regulated in India. 
However, the present book has cited many studies that have targeted ICT and has to make neces-
sary adjustments to make its statement focus on IT.
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42  Methodology
The project is an interdisciplinary research, in which legal, economic, and manage-
ment acadmics corroborate and cross-fertilize. Equally important, this project is a 
cross-country study, in which we compare and contrast China and India. Last but 
not least, this is an undertaking to explore the relationship between innovation, eco-
nomic development, and intellectual property in the actual context of India and 
China in six specific industries.
3  Summary of the Findings of the Seven Study Groups
3.1  IP Codification and Innovation Governance
IP laws as they now are stand generally quite in isolation from each other and lack 
overarching guiding principles to lead coherent legislation, interpretation, and 
application of individual IP provisions when dealing with similar or even the same 
topics, such as exhaustion, fair use, compulsory license of IP rights, damages, etc.4 
Therefore, some national states have made efforts to codify IP laws either into one 
combined piece of law or into their respective Civil Law code, whether in existence 
or under construction. Admittedly, these countries are only a minority. Yet, they 
point out the challenging questions of why some of the same legal issues are dealt 
with differently across different IP laws within one country. Is it because of igno-
rance of other IP laws? Is it because of lobbying and under-table exchange of inter-
ests between lobbyists? Is it because of unspeakable foreign pressure? Can 
codification help alleviate the inconsistency or even arm-twisting of IP laws?
In addition, codification of IP laws has a China-specific meaning. China, although 
a latecomer in the realm of IP, has skyrocketing IP numbers in the last decade with 
all kinds of state funding and promotion schemes, to the extent that people start to 
fear for the alienation of IP laws and rights, the remaining space for free and fair 
competition, and the ramifications of comprehensive state intervention for the rule 
of law in China. Chapter 2 argues passionately for the codification of IP laws into 
the future Civil Law code of China, which could even offer some lessons for com-
mon law jurisdictions such as India.
4 In Japan, however, the Trademark Act applies many articles of the Patent Act by analogy. For 
example, Article 13 provides:”(1)The provisions of Paragraphs (1) to (4) of Article 43, 43–2(2) and 
(3) of the Patent Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to an application for trademark registration… (2)
The provisions of Articles 33 and paragraphs (4) to (7) of Article 34 (Right to obtain a patent) of 
the Patent Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the rights deriving from an application for trademark 
registration.” Article 35 further provides: “Article 73 (co-ownership), 76 (Lapse of patent rights in 
absence of heir), 97(1) (waiver), and 98(1)(i) and 98(2) (Effect of registration) of the Patent Act 
shall apply mutatis mutandis to trademark rights. In this case, the term “transfer (excluding those 
by general succession including inheritance)” in Article 98 (1)(i) of the Patent Act shall be deemed 
to be replaced with “division and transfer (excluding those by general succession including 
inheritance).”
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5Chapter 3 looks into the most fundamental, yet often neglected, innovation infra-
structure of India and China, namely, the constitution and its governance and power 
structure and distribution, and tries to identify its impact on their respective national 
innovation. This chapter rightly considers the wider setting, especially the shared 
value and power structure, which is  highly relevant to the National Innovation 
System (NIS). India and China believe in socialism for modernization and have put 
socialism into the preamble of their constitutions but follow different schools of 
socialism, Fabianism for India and Marxism and Leninism for China.
Broadly speaking, the different versions of socialism substantially influence their 
ways of pursuing social revolution and social justice, which have different impacts 
on the social foundation of national innovation capacity. Following its non-violent 
strategy of civil disobedience for the independence movement, the social revolution 
after independence in India was also through non-violent means, mainly through 
universal adult suffrage. In pursuing social justice, India has institutionalized a 
credible set of checks and balances through electoral democracy plus independent 
judicial review, which on the other hand can slow down the process of innovation to 
a less optimal level.
However, China has followed Leninism, with violent revolution for social eman-
cipation. The radical social transformation has helped China build a wider setting 
for innovation such as strong awareness of social equality, access to health and 
education, and rapid development of physical infrastructure. China’s centralized 
power and policy-oriented administration make government responsive to and flex-
ible in promoting innovation but at the costs of insecurity and uncertainty caused by 
the low level of rule-based institutionalization. Although India has lagged in most 
key economic indicators compared to China, the gradual social change has saved 
India from dramatic political turbulence and from uncontrolled economic and social 
transformation as well.
3.2  IT Industry
India and China make a perfect comparison pair in the area of IT industry, with each 
having its unique strength and potential for cooperation and synergy.
3.2.1  Current Status
China
 1. IT Services and BPO/BPM
The estimated revenue of both IT services (mobile apps, e-commerce, online 
gaming, cloud computing) and BPO/BPM for 2014 was US$117  billion.5 That 
5 EU SME Centre/China-Britain Business Council, Sector Report, The ICT Market in China, 2015, 
available at: http://ccilc.pt/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/eu_sme_centre_report_-_the_ict_market_
in_china_update_-_july_2015.pdf
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6 figure is estimated to have more than doubled in 2018, reaching US$276.3 billion. 
The main players are Tencent, Baidu, Alibaba, Netease, and JD.com, with market 
value estimated to have reached US$ 1454.4 billion in 2018.6
 2. Software7
According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China 
(MIIT), the software industry can be divided into six segments, namely software 
products, system integration, operation services, embedded software, IT consulting, 
and IC design. Total revenue reached around US$ 815.8 billion in the first 11 months 
of 2018 (up to November) and about US$ 890 billion for the whole of 2018. Main 
players include Kingdee, ZTE, Neusoft, Founder Group, and Haier.
 3. Hardware8
China’s hardware industry (also known as electronic information manufacturing 
industry) mainly includes computer manufacturing, communication equipment 
(like mobile phone) manufacturing, electronic components manufacturing, and 
electron device manufacturing. Total revenue of the industry is about US$ 2.1 tril-
lion in 2018. According to Canalys, China’s client PC (including desktops, note-
books, two-in-ones and tablets) shipments will reach 88.6  million units and are 
expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.3% to reach 
101.1 million units in 2019. Main players include Lenovo, Founder Group, Haier, 
Tsinghua Tongfang, and Xiaomi.
 4. IT as a Whole9
The Chinese IT industry has developed at a high speed, and its structure was 
becoming more and more reasonable in 2017. Its main business income was over 
US$ 2.8 trillion (including communication industry), marking an 11% increase on 
a year-on-year basis. The total revenue of the software industry was about 
US$800 billion and increased 13.9% compared with 2016. The total revenue of the 
6 China Academy of Information Communication Technology: A Report on the Development 
Trend and Business Index of Chinese Internet Industry, available at: http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/
qwfb/bps/201807/P020180710555374944625.pdf
7 MIIT, The Economic Operation Situation of Chinese Software Industry in 2018 (January to 
November), available at: http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146312/n1146904/n1648374/c6564586/con-
tent.html
8 MIIT, A Research Report on the Comprehensive Development Index of Chinese Electronic 
Information Manufacturing Industry, available at: http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/
n3054355/n3057511/n3057518/c6512738/content.html, and http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/
n1146352/n3054355/n3057511/n3057518/c6529823/content.html
9 Digital China Union: Development Report of Chinese IT Industry for 2017, published at Chinese 
IT Leaders Summit Meeting (March 2018), pp. 17–18 (statistics of the whole Chinese IT industry 
for 2018 will not be available until March 2019).
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7electronic information manufacturing industry, around US$ 1.96 trillion, occupied 
a larger portion of the whole Chinese IT industry, about 71.1%. Within the elec-
tronic information manufacturing industry, the total revenue of electronic compo-
nents and electron devices grew at the highest speed and increased 17.8% and 
18.2%, respectively.
India
India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF10) classifies IT (or IT-enabled service indus-
try (ITeS)) into four main components: IT services, BPO/BPM, software products 
and engineering services, and hardware. The 2018 Indian IT and ITeS Industry 
Report published by IBEF shows the following figures11:
 1. IT Services
Market size: US$ 86 billion during 2018. Over 81% of revenue comes from the 
export market. BFSI (banking, financial services, and insurance) continues to be the 
major vertical segment of the IT sector. IT services made up around 51.7% of 
the Indian IT sector revenues in 2018.
 2. BPM
Market size: US$ 32 billion during 2018. Around 87% of revenue comes from 
the export market. The BPM industry market size is to reach US$ 54 billion by 
2025. The BPM segment made up around 19.2% of the Indian IT sector revenues in 
2018.
 3. Software Products and Engineering Services
Market size: US$ 33 billion during 2018. Over 83.9% of revenue comes from 
exports.
The software products and engineering services segment grew 10.5% in 2017. It 
made up around 19.8% of the Indian IT sector revenues in 2018.
 4. Hardware
Market size: US$ 15.4 billion in 2018. The domestic market accounts for a sig-
nificant share. The segment made up around 9.3% of the Indian IT sector revenues 
in 2018.
10 IBEF is a Trust established by the Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, Government of India. IBEF’s primary objective is to promote and create international 
awareness of the Made in India label in markets overseas and to facilitate dissemination of knowl-
edge of Indian products and services.
11 Available at https://www.ibef.org/download/it-ites-dec-2018.pdf
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8 5. IT as a Whole
Revenue reached US$ 167 billion and exports stood at US$ 126 billion in 2017–
2018. Export revenue from the digital segment forms about 20% of the industry’s 
total export revenue, which is expected to grow 7–9% year-on-year to US$ 135–
137 billion in 2019. IT service exports are projected to add US$ 10 billion in 2019 
to reach US$ 126 billion. Moreover, revenue from the digital segment is expected to 
form 38% of the total industry revenue by 2025. The IT industry employs nearly 
3.97 million people. The computer software and hardware sector attracted cumula-
tive foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows worth US$ 32.23 billion between April 
2000 and June 2018, which ranks second. India has extended tax holidays to the IT 
sector for software technology parks of India (STPI) and special economic zones 
(SEZs). Furthermore, the country is providing procedural ease and single window 
clearance for setting up facilities.
3.2.2  Major Findings
Chapters 4 and 5 have come to the following major findings.
Typical differences among IT companies in the two countries include:
 1. Indian companies enjoy high international market penetration (high-end interna-
tional markets in the IT service sector), while Chinese companies control low- 
and mid-end international markets in the manufacturing sectors.
 2. Close connections between manufacturing and service sectors in China, which 
are lacking in India, may determine the potential competitiveness of companies 
in the industries.
 3. China and India have followed different development paths in IT evolution. In 
China’s case, it is forward integration, as it has combined the domestic and inter-
national markets. In India’s case, it is backward integration, as it started from 
international markets and developed back to the domestic market.
 4. Due to heavy involvement of Indian firms in IT software outsourcing arrange-
ment by MNEs, the IP or patent resources are not important. This is especially 
true when compared with Chinese firms, which have much larger patenting vol-
ume (compared with other manufacturing sectors) in IT.
Reasons for the abovementioned differences probably lie in the following:
 1. The Indian IT industry, both the hardware and software subsectors, would not 
have thrived without the strong government policy support, ranging from open-
ing up for foreign investment well before the government officially adopted the 
policy of economic reforms in the early 1990s, duty-free import of computer 
systems for software export purposes, 100% foreign-owned enterprises for soft-
K.-C. Liu and U. S. Racherla
9ware exports operations were permitted, and the establishment of the software 
technology parks with government support.12
 2. In India, national-level patent strategies in promoting public welfare-based liti-
gation for Indian firms in the international community, maintaining a preventive 
patent database, etc. have protected Indian firms from patent snatching by non- 
Indian entities. Indian firms can also respond quickly and effectively to IP 
infringement claims by foreign companies through a highly protective IP system 
locally. In this regard, China seems to lag behind India, as China’s National IP 
Strategy emphasizes more the creation and exploitation of IP rights by private 
sectors.
 3. India’s R&D spending remained sluggish. Indian firms are weaker in self-owned 
IP assets in IT industries, in both hardware and software. In fact, based on the 
high volume of outsourcing arrangements by Indian firms, self-owned IP assets 
are not important for Indian companies in IT industries, particularly in the soft-
ware sector. In general, the Indian IT industry has not contributed to indigenous 
technology development.
3.3  Film Industry
Film industry in India and China has grown despite piracy, and India can look at 
China to find IT means for delivery and payment of cinematographic content.
3.3.1  Current Status
China
After 40 years of market liberalization, China now has a booming film industry, 
despite high piracy. The number of produced feature films increased 10 times from 
around 40 in 1997 to 402 in 2007, and annual production ranked third worldwide 
after India and the USA. In 2015, the top ten private distribution companies made 
up 84.9% of the market in domestic films distribution, contributing RMB 22.98 bil-
lion in box office revenue and 52.1% of the total box office revenue in 2015. China’s 
cinema is approaching a mega-industry. The number of cinema screens increased to 
41,179 in 2016, which was for the first time more than those in the USA. All kinds 
of macro reforms have greatly improved the productivity and market adaptability of 
Chinese film production. Noteworthy is that China enacted in 2016 the Film Industry 
12 In 2000, India enacted the Information Technology Act (IT Act), which can mislead people into 
thinking this law is to promote IT technology. Rather, the IT Act is limited to providing legal rec-
ognition for transactions carried out by means of electronic data interchange and other means of 
electronic communication, commonly referred to as “electronic commerce.” For an analysis of the 
relationship between the IT Act and Indian Copyright Act, see Raman Mittal, Actual Knowledge 
for Secondary Liability of Internet Intermediaries for Third-party Content Means Knowledge 
Based on A Court Order under Indian Information Technology Act in Kung-Chung Liu (edited) 
Annotated Leading Copyright Cases in Major Asian Jurisdictions, City University of Hong Kong 
Press, forthcoming 2019.
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Promotion Law to confirm and update the ongoing development directions of 
Chinese cinema in the form of law.13
Equally interesting is the film industry in the Special Administrative Region of 
China, Hong Kong, once the “Hollywood of the Far East” with 400 annual films, 
surpassing India, and 119 cinemas in 1993. Hong Kong’s film industry experienced 
sharp decline in the last two decades with the number of cinemas dropping to only 
47 (the second lowest per 100,000 persons/screen ratio compared to other major 
Asian cities) in 2015. It is now regaining its box office revenue, which increased to 
HK$1947  million in 2016 and HK$1853  million in 2017. However, the receipt 
increase is attributable to foreign, not domestic, films. In fact, foreign films contrib-
ute nearly 80% of the total revenue.
India
The Indian film industry is the world’s largest in terms of films produced and tickets 
sold, third-largest in terms of box office size, and fastest-growing overall. Globally, 
Indian cinema enjoys popularity among the Indian diaspora, as well as among non- 
Indian populations in certain parts of Asia and Africa, and forms a component of 
India’s global soft power. It is undeniable that a culture of piracy is prevalent 
throughout India. Pirated DVDs are openly sold in markets in Indian cities, while 
illegal file-sharing and downloading are common.
In 2012, India introduced an unwaivable right for authors of works, in particular 
authors of songs included in cinematograph films or sound recordings, to receive 
equal royalties accruing from exploitation of their works. It is important to note that 
there is no affirmative right to receive royalties in the Act. While the copyright can be 
assigned, the right to receive royalties cannot be assigned by the author to any person 
other than to the author’s heirs or a copyright society for collection and distribution 
of royalties. The 2012 amendments were devised as reactionary measures to the 
denial of royalties and mismanagement of copyright societies in India by music 
labels. However, to date, copyright societies have refused to comply with the dictates 
of the amendments by all sorts of legal gambit (for more details, see Chap. 9).
Screening of Indian Films in China and Chinese Films in India
So far, Chinese movies have not made much headway into the Indian market. Indian 
movies as foreign movies are subject to a quota system (some follow the pattern of 
buyout of screening rights, others follow the profit-sharing arrangement) in China 
and were not much in demand. India and China signed an agreement on movie co- 
production in 2014 that would indirectly boost the screening of Indian and Chinese 
films in the two countries. The breakthrough only came in 2017 with the film 
“Dangal,” which has a record box office of RMB 1.299 billion. In 2018, Indian 
13 Article 29 of the Law imposes on cinemas a high quota of showing Chinese films no less than 2/3 
of the total show time. The United Kingdom enacted the Cinematograph Films Act of 1927 designed 
to stimulate the declining British film industry and to counter Hollywood’s perceived economic and 
cultural dominance. It introduced a requirement for British cinemas to show a quota of British films, 
for a duration of 10 years. The act is generally not considered a success and was eventually repealed 
by the Films Act 1960; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cinematograph_Films_Act_1927
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movies have become the second most popular foreign movies in China, only next to 
Hollywood.14
Major Findings
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 have come to the following major findings:
 1. Film industries thrive in both India and China despite high piracy rates. In other 
words, film industries prospered with little or no copyright protection. More 
importantly, piracy did not kill the content industry in China and India, film and 
music alike, but probably helped in building the customer base and cultivating 
future demand, which might not be true for a small economy with a sophisticated 
audience such as Hong Kong. So long there is demand and appetite for movies, 
new ways of paying for movies will be schemed up, be it direct fee payment by 
buying tickets online, Internet service/bandwidth subscription, or indirect with 
ad sponsorship. The stronger demand there is for movies, the faster the emer-
gence of new technical means for delivering content and fee-charging, as the 
Chinese film industry has shown how it can easily ride on the ubiquitous smart-
phones and smart TVs for this purpose.
 2. Major Internet giants in China such as Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (the so-called 
BAT) have been swarming into the film industry, bringing with them big data, 
technology, funding, platforms, and fundamental changes to audiovisual ser-
vices, transforming their business models from providing illegal content to legal 
but free (ad-sponsored) content and to legal and paid premium content. As a 
result, they not only provide instantaneous access to quality films and make 
enforcement of copyright against piracy easy but also fundamentally change 
consumers’ behavior and habits in digital content consumption and help set up 
an industrial code or self-regulation for the digital film market. More and more, 
copyright law is playing a significant role in the furtherance of cinema industri-
alization. China is the future India in terms of copyright protection. In that 
regards, China’s IT industry could very well lend a helping hand.
 3. It is amazing to find out how the Chinese private film industry, including private 
film studios and private distribution chains, has managed to boom despite state 
ideology and a state-monopolized film production and distribution system within 
a short span of 40 years. The desire to create, share, and enjoy content, the foun-
dation of freedom of expression, is simply unstoppable, even in the era of politi-
cal left-leaning.
 4. The Hong Kong story of how the director-centric production system, due mostly 
to the kung fu genre, has resulted in “guerrilla filmmaking,” “script-butchering,” 
and diluting the storyline, and how scriptwriters remain weak and unprotected 
caused by the lack of the collective bargaining right, is very illuminating for the 
film industry in any other economy. So is the overall poor infrastructure of the 
industry, particularly in terms of education, production, and distribution, which 
led also to the industry’s decline. Moreover, different from other major 
14 http://www.sohu.com/a/280668438_757761
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 film- producing jurisdictions which grant the right of exploitation to the producer 
exclusively, such as Italy, France, Germany, China, Korea (per law), USA, and 
Japan (per practice), in Hong Kong a film is principally co-owned by the pro-
ducer and the principal director. However, joint ownership is prone to conflicts – 
between the interests of the producer and principal director, conflicts of applicable 
laws when the joint owners are from different jurisdictions – and disadvanta-
geous for exploitation.
3.4  Pharmaceutical Industry
The importance of the pharmaceutical industry for India and China is beyond 
description. As it happens, the two “fellow sufferers15” make a perfect comparison 
pair in the pharmaceutical industry as well. This time around, China can learn much 
from India.
3.4.1  Current Status
India
In India, domestic generic companies have been far ahead of the affiliates of foreign 
companies for the past three decades, ever since the generic companies were able to 
establish themselves as major players in the industry. The growth in sales registered 
by the leading generic producers in the early 1990s led to a complete transformation 
of the composition of market leaders. In 1994–1995, five of the ten top firms in 
terms of sales were the associates of foreign firms. But two decades later, nine of the 
top ten sellers were generic firms. Generic producers are the most profitable among 
all the leading sectors of the Indian industry. On average, they have registered 
double- digit profits since 2011, which could be much higher after including the data 
for the global operations.
The Indian pharmaceutical sector attracted US$ 15.59  billion worth of FDI 
between 2000 and 2017. In Q2 2018, the Indian pharmaceutical sector posted pri-
vate equity and venture capital investments of US$ 396 million. Also, in 2017, India 
witnessed 46 mergers and acquisitions worth US$ 1.47 billion. Over the past two 
decades, India’s total trade in pharmaceutical products increased from less than US$ 
2 billion to more than US$ 27 billion. This expansion came on the back of strong 
export performance, increased from just over US$ 1 billion in 1996 to over US$ 
20 billion in 2016. India’s place in the global market as supplier of cheap generics 
is confirmed by the pharmaceutical industry’s growing presence in the market for 
formulations. Since the beginning of the current decade, exports of formulations 
have steadily increased, while bulk drug exports have stagnated. Between 2005 and 
2016, bulk drug imports have increased more than threefold. China has emerged as 
the largest supplier of bulk drugs, supplying nearly two-thirds of Indian total 
imports.
15 Both have a long history of traditional medicines and yet are both “lagging” behind in the devel-
opment of patented new drugs.
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Market penetration of generic drugs increased rapidly after the enactment of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984. By the early years of the new millennium, generic 
drugs comprised more than 47% of the prescriptions filled for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, up from 19% in 1984. The Office of Generic Drugs of the US FDA reports that 
currently, 9 out of 10 prescriptions filled are for generic drugs. The USA is the sin-
gle largest market for Indian formulations, taking up 39% market share. This market 
expanded from less than $300 million in 2005 to over $5.2 billion in 2016.
China
In 2010 China’s pharmaceutical industry achieved sales of US$ 41.1 billion, making 
it the third largest in sales worldwide. In 2016, the business income of large-scale 
industrial enterprises in China’s pharmaceutical industry reached RMB 2.96 tril-
lion, an increase of 9.92% over the previous year. In 2015, China’s biopharmaceuti-
cal manufacturing revenue from product sales was RMB 186.4 billion, and the total 
profit was RMB 31.0 billion, up 14.8% and 21.6%, respectively, over the previous 
year. China is the second largest producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients 
(APIs) and the largest producer of penicillin and P-Lactam drugs and vitamins, 
accounting for 30% of the world’s total output. The trade volume in pharmaceutical 
and health products in China in 2017 was US$116.76 billion, including US$60.8 bil-
lion in exports and US$55.88 billion in imports. It enjoyed a US$4.9 billion trade 
surplus, a 34.60% drop compared with the previous year.
More than 97% of the domestically produced drugs are generics. Most pharma-
ceutical companies in China mainly focus on producing generics with relatively low 
technical requirements and mature technologies. Serious overcapacity exists. The 
utilization rate of production capacity of tablets, capsules, powder injection, and 
water injection were less than 45%, 40%, 27%, and 50%, respectively. In China, 
pharma companies are small in scale, a substantial percentage of them are in deficit 
(15% in 2009), and market concentration is low (the aggregate market share of the 
ten biggest companies (CR10) was 15.10% in 2004). As a result, pharmaceutical 
companies have an R&D intensity of merely 1.77% on average, while the top ten 
pharmaceutical companies in the USA and India have an R&D intensity of 35.3% 
and 15.9%, respectively. In 2011, the cost of purchasing drugs by residents accounted 
for 50%–62% of the total health expenditure in China, much higher than the world 
average of 20%–30%. In 2010, drugs revenue accounted for 42.1% of the total rev-
enue of government-run medical institutions in China.
Among the pharmaceutical products currently manufactured in China, less than 
3% have IP rights. The market of patented drugs is only RMB 12 billion, less than 
1% of the domestic pharmaceutical market. The treatment of most infectious dis-
eases such as chronic hepatitis B, AIDS, and other diseases depends on imported 
patented drugs, which are expensive. Almost all of the clinical standard medicines 
used in these areas of chronic diseases are patented drugs or patent-expired drugs. 
Nearly 90% of the patented drugs come from foreign enterprises.
However, annual patent application for polymorphic drugs in China has increased 
significantly in the last three decades. From 1985 to 2005, 2116 applications were 
from China, 651 were from the USA, and 432 were from Germany, India, and 
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Switzerland. From 2005 to 2014, the total number of patent applications from 
China was 3009, an average of 301 applications each year, with the average annual 
growth rate at 147.9%.
Major Findings
Chapters 10, 11, 12, and 13 have come to the following major findings:
 1. The powerful constitutional obligations of the Indian state to improve public 
health and to guarantee every person and citizen of India the right to life and 
personal liberty while promoting its innovation ecosystem and safeguarding the 
legitimate business interests of inventors have been shaping the evolution of the 
Indian patent regime since India’s independence in 1947, and all the way up to 
today, despite being listed either as a “Priority Foreign Country” or included on 
the “Priority Watch List” by the US Trade Representative (USTR) since 1989. 
Therefore, India is well known as a patent maverick. The refusal to grant product 
patents and the shortening of the period of patent protection for pharmaceutical 
process (5–7 years as against 14 years for other fields of technology in India’s 
pre-TRIPS patent regime) allowed the generic pharmaceutical industry to grow 
starting from the 1970s. In contrast, China, despite having a constitutional man-
date for the state to protect people’s health,16 has been a naïve patent taker, not 
the least in the pharma industry, and never questioned the patent regime advo-
cated by the international IP establishment.
 2. After being updated to be TRIPS compliant in 2005, the Indian Patents Act con-
tinuously utilizes the leeway left by the TRIPS Agreement, including preventing 
evergreening of patented drugs, awarding compulsory license, retaining the pre- 
grant opposition, and introducing the post-grant opposition, to better suit its 
national interests and developmental needs. It is therefore expected that India’s 
pharma industry is poised to further outperform its Chinese counterpart.
 3. India’s experiences in legislation and judicial practice to promote the develop-
ment of its domestic pharmaceutical industry deserve serious attention from 
China. The ingenious government legal maneuvering can serve as a good exam-
ple for China to adjust its tactics in international IP negotiation and long-held 
blind faith in IP.  Learning from India, China should start to provide its legal 
professionals with knowledge of global IP rules.
 4. Although there is an increase in the number of patented drugs in the pharmaceu-
tical industry in China, patents have made relatively low contribution to the 
industrial value, and IP held by Chinese firms is less competitive compared with 
that of foreign companies. In contrast, although major Indian companies are all 
producers of generic medicines, they continued to invest sizeable shares of their 
16 Article 21(1) of the PRC Constitution mandates that “The state develops medical and health 
services, promotes modern medicine and traditional Chinese medicine, encourages and supports 
the setting up of various medical and health facilities by the rural economic collectives, state enter-
prises and institutions and neighbourhood organizations, and promotes health and sanitation activi-
ties of a mass character, all for the protection of the people’s health.”
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sales turnover in R&D, up from 1.5% at the end of the 1990s, to 2% in 2000–
2001, and to nearly 7% in 2015–2016. This aspect of the functioning was mani-
fest in their patenting behavior. They were more active in filing patent applications 
in foreign jurisdictions, but significantly less so in domestic patenting.
3.5  Plant Varieties and Food Security
Food security is of high importance for the two most populous countries of India 
and China. To ensure food security, India enacted the National Food Security Act 
(NFSA) in September 2013, while the National People’s Congress of China is now 
working on passing a bill on Food Security Law. Genetically engineered or modi-
fied crop plants are relevant for food security in India and China, as high-yielding 
crops can help overcome life-threatening food crises, achieve food surplus and feed 
their masses. India, with 11.4 million hectares (6%), ranks 5th, and China, with 
2.8 million hectares (1%), ranks eighth among the 24 countries which planted bio-
tech crops in 2017.17 During the first 21  years of commercialization of biotech 
crops, from  1996 to 2016, India has gained US$21.1  billion  sales and China 
US$19.6 billion.18
3.5.1  Current Status
India
India is the highest exporter of rice in the world. India was the ninth largest exporter 
of agricultural products in 2017, and the sector constitutes a share of 13% of total 
exports of the country.
With the incorporation of gene technology, India has evolved from an importer 
to an exporter of cotton, and at present, India’s average yield is around 500 kg of lint 
per hectare. India is now the biggest producer of cotton. The cotton production in 
India for 2017–2018 is around 365 lakh (100,000) bales (1 bale  =  170  kg) and 
exports between 65 and 70 lakh bales. However, due to demand and consumption 
by local mills, India stands as the fourth largest exporter of cotton, behind the USA, 
Australia, and Brazil. As it stands, there are no food crops approved for use in India 
using GM technology. The Indian regulatory authority, the Genetic Engineering 
Approval Committee (GEAC), has approved Bt brinjal (eggplant) as being biosafe 
in 2017. However, its commercialization was not approved by the Ministry of 
Environment, Forests and Climate Change.
The IP framework for genetically engineered crops is prescriptive in its scope, 
and the recent judgments preclude protection for technologies for the development 
of genetically engineered plants under the existing provisions of the Patents Act, 
1970. This would perhaps serve to disincentive players who have developed propri-
etary technologies from bringing their latest inventions for use by farmers in India.
17 The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech App (ISAAA), Global Status of 
Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops in 2017, 5.
18 Ibid., 8.
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China
In recent years, scandals involving illegal production and distribution of GM rice 
and its products have been consecutively exposed, which has led to mistrust among 
the public. As a response, the Food Safety Law was revised in 2015 to require that 
the production and distribution of GM food shall be clearly labeled. As far as GM 
foods are concerned, there are only regulations on transgenic agricultural products 
in general and labeling requirements provided by the Food Safety Law in particular. 
The lack of detailed legislation reflects China’s evasive attitude toward this issue.
China has achieved remarkable results for the protection of new plant varieties 
since it promulgated and implemented the Regulations for the Protection of New 
Plant Varieties in 1997. In the revision of the Seeds Law in 2015, a section on the 
protection of new plant varieties was added. By 2016, the number of applications 
for new plant variety rights in China already ranked first in the world. From 1999 to 
June 2018, China approved a total of some 12,221 breeders’ rights, of which 10,863 
are for agriculture and 1,358 are for forestry (188 were obtained by foreign appli-
cants from 9 countries, accounting for 13.84% of the total forestry breeders’ rights). 
Chinese breeders mainly apply for breeders’ rights in China and rarely pay attention 
to applying for breeders’ rights abroad.
Major Findings
Chapters 14, 15, 16, and 17 have come to the following major findings:
 1. Genes, proteins, promoters, enhancers, and chemicals in plants cannot get spe-
cific protection under the plant variety law and need to be protected under the 
patent regime. A recombinant DNA construct, which is neither a plant nor part 
thereof, nor a variety, can be protected under the patent regime and not under the 
plant variety law. Rights under the plant variety law and the rights granted under 
the patent law operate in completely different spheres. In India and China, what 
is protected under the patent law cannot be protected under the plant variety law 
and vice versa.
 2. While India is still grappling with poverty, famine, shortage in food supply, and 
massive hikes in prices of basic foodstuffs, China has overcome these issues 
since 2007 at the latest by self-supply19. However, both countries have witnessed 
scandalous planting of GM plants and are in need of a robust regulatory frame-
work to oversee the development of the genetic industry in agriculture.
3.6  Automobile Industry
Both India and China are catching up in the automobile industry in the last two 
decades. Comparatively speaking, the Indian automobile industry’s absorption of 
global best practices has been slower than its Chinese counterpart. Strategies of 
firms in the Chinese auto industry provided a boost to technological learning more 
19 National Development and Reform Commission, Food Supply Abundant and Market Demand 
Effectively Satisfied in China (in Chinese), China Economic and Trade Herald, 2018, Issue 22, 63.
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quickly and broadly than in India, especially in the electric vehicle (EV) sector. 
India can benefit from learning from China.
3.6.1  Current Status
China
China has become the world’s largest automotive producer and consumer, and the 
previous dominant strategy of the assemblage of imported foreign designs only has 
already given way to the strategy of indigenous innovation. No doubt, the indige-
nous car-makers are far from being global technology leaders, yet they are gradually 
becoming competitive in the global automobile market with the rise of EVs. China 
overtook the USA as the world’s largest producer and consumer of EVs in 2015. 
EVs are to some extent an innovation with technological discontinuities, as motors 
and batteries are employed to replace the engines and gearboxes of the fossil fuel 
vehicles (FFVs). EVs are better able to interface with computer-based technologies, 
such as AI, the mobile Internet, and cloud computing. This has induced an explosive 
development of ICT technology applications on the car platform, creating an oppor-
tunity for China to pursue catch-up development.
The influx of new local entrants has fundamentally changed the rules of the game 
in China’s car industry. Since 2001, as the new entrants gradually obtained regula-
tory approval, the entire production scale and the amounts of new products launched 
annually in China’s car industry have skyrocketed, due to the leveraging effects 
created by new firms.
From 1999 to 2017, multinationals have submitted a total number of 87,089 pat-
ent applications in China, while new local entrants filed 66,043 and backbone state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs) and joint ventures (JVs) filed 32,227. Multinationals 
have the highest ratio of inventions, at 79.53% (69,265), and a low ratio of utility 
models, merely 3.06%. The respective ratios for new local entrants are 32.84% and 
50.24% and for backbone SOEs and JVs 20.55% and 57.72%. The group of back-
bone SOEs and JVs exhibit obvious weakness in patent applications, as 58% of their 
patents fall in the category of utility model. The patent grant rate for the backbone 
SOEs and JVs is just 35.35%, markedly below that of multinationals and new local 
entrants, which are 57.01% and 50.28%, respectively. Most patent applications of 
multinationals are submitted by entities from their home countries, which indicates 
that their collaboration with JV partners in China remains highly irrelevant to their 
patent applications.
India
The automobile industry is one of the most important drivers of economic growth in 
India and one with high participation in global value chains. The automobiles pro-
duced in the country uniquely cater to the demands of low- and middle-income 
groups of the population. In 2017, India became the world’s fourth largest automo-
bile market, and the demand for Indian vehicles continues to grow in the domestic 
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and international markets. India was the sixth largest producer of automobiles glob-
ally, with an average annual production of about 29 million vehicles in 2017–2018, 
of which about four million were exported. India is the largest tractor manufacturer, 
second largest two-wheeler manufacturer, second largest bus manufacturer, fifth 
largest heavy truck manufacturer, and eighth largest commercial vehicle manufac-
turer. The contribution of this sector to GDP has increased from 2.77% in 1992–
1993 to about 7.1% and accounts for about 49% of manufacturing GDP (2015–2016). 
It employs more than 29 million people (directly and indirectly). The turnover of the 
automobile industry is approximately US$ 67 billion (2016–2017) and that of the 
component industry is US$ 43.5 billion (2015–2016). The Indian industry accounted 
for 4.92% of vehicle production globally in 2017 (5.38% of production in the cars 
segment and 3.48% of production in the commercial vehicles segment). India con-
tinues to be a net importer of auto components, with its trade deficit for auto com-
ponents increasing from US$ 210  million in 2004–2005 to US$ 4.4  billion in 
2009–2010 and US$ 13.8 billion in 2015–2016.
As of today, the government encourages foreign investment and allows 100% 
FDI in the sector via the automatic route. The industry is fully de-licensed and free 
imports of automotive components are allowed. The Automotive Mission Plan 
2016–2026 envisions that the Indian automotive industry will be among top three in 
the world in engineering, manufacture, and export of vehicles and auto compo-
nents by 2026, growing in value to over 12% of India’s GDP and generating an 
additional 65 million jobs.
Major Findings
Chapters 18 and 19 have come to the following major findings:
 1. Government policy has played a pivotal role in the development of automobile 
industries in India and China. In China, the sectoral system of automobiles was 
mainly supported by two institutional pillars. The first pillar was strict regulation 
of entry permission, according to which all car products formally launched into 
the Chinese domestic market for sale must have prior permission from the MIIT 
to be listed in a regularly updated product catalogue. “Catalog-based regulation,” 
a rigid legacy of the planned system, continues even after the transition to indig-
enous innovation. The second pillar is the “trading market for technology 
(TMFT)” policy since the 1980s. This strategy literally involves the trading of 
market access for technology with the multinationals possessing advanced tech-
nology, as acquisition of intangible IP assets on technologies would be less pro-
ductive without the benefit of associated operational learning and expertise.
It was not until China’s introduction of “the 1994 automobile industry policy” 
that car-making has been recognized as a national pillar industry. China’s devel-
opmental strategy has transitioned to focusing on indigenous innovation by the 
National Medium- and Long-term Science and Technology Development  Outline 
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(2006–2020), which allows a group of new, local, innovative firms to enter the 
industry. Later on, the Chinese government has tabled a range of battery research 
and production projects and promulgated policies to encourage investment in the 
development and industrialization of EVs while subsidizing investments in 
infrastructure, especially a network of rechargeable devices.
The sum of subsidies provided by central and regional governments usually 
reaches 50% of the purchase price of EVs. It is only after 2013, witnessing how 
the new administration of Xi continues to stress indigenous innovation, that the 
backbone SOEs have begun to take innovation seriously.
Policy makers in China have decided to shift the policies again: the restric-
tions on foreign investment in China’s EV industry have been removed in 2018; 
fully liberalized entry into the entire auto industry will be allowed in 5 years; the 
subsidy for purchasing EVs will be totally abolished by 2020 and has already 
been gradually reduced since 2017. The long-existing policy preferences for JVs 
will fade away.
In India, the growth of the automobile sector has been on the back of strong 
government support, which has helped it carve a unique path among the manu-
facturing sectors of India. Indian policy had favored the development of the com-
mercial vehicles industry (light and heavy vehicles for public transport) as 
opposed to the development of passenger vehicles – considered luxury goods. 
By the early 1980s, the government had realized the need to develop the passen-
ger vehicle segment and took decisions to allow FDI in automotive assembly in 
two major waves in 1983 and in 1993. This FDI was mainly “market seeking” in 
nature. Government policies such as import barriers and local content require-
ments contributed to the influx of FDI. Liberal policies of the 1990s led to the 
entry of new competitors and spillover benefits, especially on the technology 
side, and to increased expenditure on R&D.  The setting up of the National 
Automotive Testing and R&D Infrastructure Project under the Automotive 
Mission Plan 2006-16 enabled the industry to achieve parity with global stan-
dards. Local content requirements or indigenization of up to 70% forced OEMs 
and their suppliers to make significant capital investments and created a chain of 
world-class component suppliers.
 2. IP has played a relatively limited role in the development of the automobile 
industry in India and China. Unlike a science-based industry, the car-making 
industry is manufacturing-intensive and scale-intensive. Its key knowledge is 
embedded in manufacturing or design experience and does not appear in explicit 
forms such as utility/invention patents. Although patents are becoming increas-
ingly important, a vast majority of “know-how” or “know-whom” kind of knowl-
edge in this industry cannot be mastered through the acquisition of patents or 
patent licenses. Indeed, the technical trade or R&D collaboration of many core 
businesses is through engineering services, design transfer (usually including 
engineering services), and component supplies. Hence, capacity building in this 
industry is a long-term process and may take many decades for latecomers.
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This is true for India and China. For example, without absorptive capacity for 
assessing and assimilating technologies, the backbone SOE Beijing Auto bought 
most of the IPs of SAAB in 2009; however, many of SAAB’s high-value IPs had 
already been peeled off before the deal, as previously they had been traded for 
several rounds on the market. New entrants underwent a wide range of technical 
cooperation with international professional technology firms after the 1990s, 
played a more dominant role and were better able to identify technologies at the 
systemic level and explore more frontier issues.
In India, the number of patents granted to the seven leading Indian manufacturers 
between the period of January 1990 and July 2018 has increased, but not signifi-
cantly. Tata’s patents have increased the most, more than 5 times, but its absolute 
number has jumped from only 10 between 2001 and 2010 to 57 between 2011 
and 2018.
3.7  The Culture of Sharing and the Sharing Economy
Both India and China consume goods and services in astronomic numbers and 
might face the threat of undersupply of goods and services and environmental crisis 
when they are supplied and consumed to heart’s content of the Chinese and Indian 
people, as it would “burn up, heat up, eat up, plow up, choke up, and smoke up the 
planet.20” The sharing economy as a new economy that creates sufficient supply 
through an effective mechanism for search and matching holds great promises for 
India and China. By sharing economy we refer to all business models facilitated by 
collaborative platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary usage of 
goods or services often provided by private individuals, leading to the sharing of 
resources for their optimum utilization.
3.8  Current Status
China
With the maturing of Internet technology, mobile payment, logistics infrastructure, 
and huge demographic dividends, China’s sharing economy has been leaping for-
ward rapidly in recent years. In 2015 the size of the main sectors of China’s sharing 
market amounted to about RMB 1,697.8  billion; the figure jumped to RMB 
3,452 billion in 2016, an annual increase of 103% and accounting for GDP 4.6%. In 
2016, over 600 million people participated in sharing economy activities in China. 
The number of participants in the service sector was approximately 60 million, with 
approximately 5.85 million employees serving on platforms. The sharing economy 
is expected to account for 10% of GDP by 2020 and 20% by 2025.
20 Thomas Friedman, A Green New Deal revisited, New York Times, International edition, Jan. 11, 
2019, 11.
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India
The Internet users in India are projected to increase from 331.77 million in 2017 to 
511.89 million in 2022. The vast majority (>95%) are mobile phone Internet users, 
and the young generations of Indians that have a preference to create, trade, swop, 
access, and share goods, services, and resources as opposed to owning them, build-
ing the powerful undercurrents for the sharing economy in India. Thus, in today’s 
India, a variety of new businesses have sprung across a wide range of industries, 
such as transportation (e.g., Uber, Ola, ZipGo, BlaBlaCar, Smartmumbaikar.com, 
Didi Kuaidi), accommodation (Airbnb, Couchsurfing), work space sharing 
(WeWork, Regus, CoWrks, Awfis), retail commerce (e-Bay, Flipkart, Myntra, 
Jabong, Snapdeal), business loans (Biz2Credit), designer clothing (Rent It Bae), 
everyday clothing (Swishlist), and furniture and appliances (Fabrento, Rentickle, 
and Furlenco).21
Interestingly, even rural India has become the cradle of the sharing economy in a 
unique way.22 Thus, Mahindra & Mahindra, one of the auto giants of India, created 
a sharing platform, Trringo, which allows farmers to rent equipments made by 
Mahindra (and even by its competitors) through placing a call. As a result, Mahindra 
has been able to increase its customer base, build brand awareness, and, drive rural 
prosperity by empowering farmers. Thus, sharing economy has been rapidly grow-
ing in India, particularly as the Gen Z consumers are discovering that it serves their 
goals and interests more effectively compared to owning the depreciating, underuti-
lized assets.
In summary, sharing economy has been boosting the innovative entrepreneurship 
of bold new ideas in India, leading to – creation of disruptive businesses, optimal 
resource utilization, creation of new jobs, skill development, plus flexibility to oper-
ate at one’s own convenience. Nevertheless, while India’s GDP is expected to grow 
at 7.3% in 2018–2019,23 accurate estimates of the contribution of sharing economy 
to the GDP of India or its growth are not yet readily available.
Major Findings
Chapters 20 and 21, more complementary in nature than providing comparable data 
on India and China, have come to the following major findings:
 1. The sharing economy in India has not taken up the pace of China, probably due 
to lack of knowledge sharing, which is an integral part of the sharing economy. 
There are gender-based restrictions to knowledge as well as caste-based restric-
tions to knowledge. The National Intellectual Property Rights Policy and the 
Startup India Action Plan in 2016 have a bearing on shaping incentives for inno-
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 2. The emergence of various business models and a series of legal risks and chal-
lenges that have restricted or are restricting the development of China’s sharing 
economy, such as duplicated investment and vicious competition; opportunistic 
behavior, including the infringement of consumer rights and the distortion of 
reputation evaluation systems; and negative externality issues, could serve as 
good lessons for India.
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